8.14.2008

digital conscription and the potential for nationalised botnets.

I accidentally listened to CBC radio one this morning, and the topic of discussion was the denial of service attacks that made up a portion of the Russian attacks on Georgia.

This is going to become standard operating procedure in a major conflict, I think.

In terms of basic background, the DDoS attacks started before the physical invasion, and seem to have been conducted not by the Russian Military, but by a criminal syndicate, either for patriotic, or financial reasons.

This is interesting as a means of disrupting communication – you no longer have to just worry about mainstream media outlets, when you are trying to enforce a media blackout, which is why the attacks also attempted to take down the Georgian internet access altogether.  Citizen media has more or less made it essential to take down the internet first.  You can’t silence people as long as the internet exists as an option to them.

What I’m wondering about, is how long it takes before some nations more or less mandate every computer in the country being ‘subscribed’ to a botnet controlled by the government agency responsible for online communications, or the military.

What happens when governments and military leaders realize that conscription is a viable option in building their capacity for cyberwarfare?  Is this option better, or worse than contracting out the dirty work to organized crime?

So, that was my morning.

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